


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
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
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Price Five Shillings.

on the night of the 17th June.



B S B
MÜNCHEN

FRENCH ACCOUNT

OF THE

LAST CAMPAIGN

OF

B U O N A P A R T E,

WRITTEN BY AN EYE-WITNESS.

~~~~~  
TRANSLATED BY CAPTAIN THORNTON, 78th Regt.

~~~~~  
WITH

A PLAN

OF THE

BATTLE OF WATERLOO,

SKETCHED BY THE TRANSLATOR.

~~~~~  
A dreadful lesson of example'd fate,  
To curb the nations, and to guard the great.

*Pope's Homer.*

~~~~~  
London :

PRINTED FOR JAMES BLACK,

YORK-STREET, COVENT-GARDEN.

1816.

Price Five Shillings.

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
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London

PRINTED FOR JAMES BLACK

78th STREET, COVENT-GARDEN

Hughes and Baynes, Printers,
Maiden-Lane, Covent-Garden, London.

96/96/70

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IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

TO

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR J. WILLOUGHBY GORDON, K.C.B.

QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH FORCES,


&c. &c. &c.

BY HIS MOST OBEDIENT

AND OBLIGED HUMBLE SERVANT,

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THE landing of Napoleon at Cannes was a clap of thunder to all good Frenchmen and true patriots; for every one, in a word, who sincerely wished the peace and happiness of his country. Indeed, nothing could be expected from this event, but the most fatal results of a civil war, which seemed inevitable.

However, by a succession of circumstances as extraordinary as unexpected, the danger was averted for some time. Who would believe it! Napoleon, devoted to the general hatred of a nation, upon which he had heaped every misfortune, still found in its bosom thousands of men disposed to support his culpable projects.

All the army shamefully betrayed the oaths they had made to the best of kings; and, carrying their misconduct to the utmost, soon compelled him to quit his capital. Good

Frenchmen then had the grief to see Napoleon arrive triumphantly at Paris.

No sooner was he again in power, than he employed all possible means to deceive the French, in order to force from them the greatest sacrifices ; and he was constantly engaged in forming plans for plunging the nation into an abyss of misfortunes, from which it could not be extricated but with himself.

He caused the most injurious and absurd reports to be circulated against the king, to alarm the possessors of national property ; and he professed the principles of a numerous class of citizens, with a view of attaching them to his cause ; at the same time, he announced openly and with the greatest assurance, that he was in alliance with Austria, and that the early arrival of Maria-Louisa would soon give an unequivocal proof of the good understanding which existed with the Austrian government.

Misled by assurances so positive, France gave herself up, for some time, to the hope of avoiding a war, which she had declared against all Europe, by receiving once more, in defiance of every treaty, the man she had proscribed for ever. Men of reflection, all true patriots, whom personal interest or the false ideas of independence had never intoxicated, entertained reasonable doubts respecting the reality of such changes, but they endeavoured to reconcile them, and to persuade themselves that Napoleon

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Hence, Napoleon succeeded in deceiving France, into a confidence, which he did not fail to take advantage of in the struggle he was preparing. Thus, to the disgrace of the nation, this disturber of her repose was received and saluted as her liberator.

He declared his wish was for peace, he invoked the treaty of Paris; and, not to legitimate his rights by supreme power alone, rights which had already been sufficiently consecrated by the bayonet, he called together an assembly of the people, and required no other services from them, than to proclaim the war, which he provoked, national. Thirsting for vengeance, and a prey to that ambition which had already ruined him, he dreamed of nothing but victories and conquests; and though he ostensibly preserved some respect for the French people, yet it was only to make the nation the instrument of his mad projects. But the truth pierced through the thick cloud, with which he endeavoured to obscure it: already impatient to figure again on the dreadful theatre of war, he urged, with incredible activity, the formation of the armies.

Troops were raised in all parts, they united

and marched for the frontiers ; the regiments were completed by returned prisoners, retired soldiers, and new levies, and the national guards were reorganized. Artillery, arms of all sorts, and equipment, started up, as it were, by enchantment ; and in a few days, all France was transformed into a vast camp. While a numerous army filed towards Belgium, others assembled in Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche-Comté, and by the side of the Alps and the Pyrennees.

Napoleon appeared sincerely to wish for the preservation of peace, yet the Powers of Europe knew too well the character of the man, to deliberate a moment on the part they had to act. Several declarations were promulgated by the Congress of Vienna, announcing that they saw in him only an adventurer, with whom they would hold no political correspondence. From that moment, all communication with France was intercepted, and innumerable armies were directed against her.

There was then nothing more to hope from the mediation of Austria, and all Europe was seen to rise a second time, to hurl from the throne a man, who menaced the Powers with fresh aggressions, in order to force them to acknowledge his power.

In the midst of all these movements, the deputies of the departments repaired to Paris, to attend at the ceremony of the Champ-de-Mai, an assembly called together by the addi-

tional act of the constitution of the Empire. Among a vast number of men of eminent probity, enlightened and animated with the best intentions, it was not without uneasiness that a great many were observed, whose names the Revolution had rendered of alarming celebrity, and above all, a crowd of needy military men, incapable of any other views than those of exclusive preponderance, solely founded on the blades of their sabres.

It was in such hands the destinies of the country were entrusted. This additional act, which, in betraying an unreserved intention to legalize a despotic government, ought to have devoted to public indignation the dictator, who had the audacity to present it as liberal and free ; but, on the contrary, was it not servilely agreed to by those, who, in affecting to speak the language of independence, were nothing, in reality, but the passive instruments of the will of Napoleon? They had the impudence to proclaim, as the general wish of the nation, the inconsiderate opinion of a few thousands of individuals, of a class the least worthy to be invested with deliberative power, and for the most part composed of an ignorant soldiery, absolutely incapable of all discernment. France, in a word, restrained by terror and treated as a conquered country by its own army, was compelled to acknowledge the

laws, and submit to the military sway of Napoleon.

While these events were passing in the capital, the armies were continually receiving strong reinforcements, and concentrating their forces upon the frontiers. About the beginning of June, the army of the North, the most numerous of all, occupied very extended cantonments in the departments of the North and of the Aisne, where the troops were disposed *en echelon*.

The grand head-quarters were at Laon. The 1st corps occupied Valenciennes, and the 2nd Maubeuge.

They communicated on the right with the armies of the Ardennes and Moselle, the left resting upon Lille. Composed, for the most part, of old soldiers recently restored to the ranks, they were animated with the greatest courage, and inflamed with an immoderate enthusiasm for Napoleon. These troops lived in the best understanding with the inhabitants of the department of the Aisne; the latter considered the war unavoidable, as well as national, and having no other object in view than the defence of their country against a second invasion, they were occupied with great zeal and activity in fortifying the entrances into their territory, and raising obstacles to retard the march of the enemy. Every where the towns

were fortified, and têtes de pont constructed, abattis, entrenchments, and even redouts, were raised upon the routes and to secure the passes.

The national guards took up arms with the greatest alacrity, and the population were ready to rise en masse at the approach of the enemy: the same spirit manifested itself in all the departments, which had previously been invaded, and had become the theatre of the war in 1814, excepting the department of the North, which haughtily expressed opposite sentiments, and where the presence of the troops was supported with undissembled impatience. Not a single conscript could be collected in this department, and the national guards obstinately refused to march.

Nevertheless, the army reckoned on the cordial co-operation of the inhabitants, the moment hostilities should commence; and the inhabitants, in their turn, had the most entire confidence in the army, and generally believed the allies had only succeeded in invading France in 1814, in consequence of repeated treasons.

The commencement of the war, then, was looked for with perfect confidence; and the army, peaceable in its cantonments, but impatient to fight, only complained of the slowness of the allies in presenting themselves.

Such was the state of things when it was

understood the imperial guards had quitted Paris, after the ceremony of the Champ-de-Mai, and were directed, by forced marches, upon Laon; that Napoleon had followed this movement a few days after, and had repaired, in all haste, to the frontiers. In fact, he was seen to arrive at Vervins almost at the same moment with the guard; he there put himself at the head of his army, which had marched from its cantonments to concentrate: the passage of troops by Vervins and Avesnes was incessant for several days.

It remains yet to be explained by what means Napoleon succeeded in fascinating an immense population and the army, so that the former, without fear, saw all the calamities of war falling upon them, and the latter boldly faced all the forces of Europe; certain it is, wherever he appeared, he was received with the most lively and unanimous acclamations.

It was not generally supposed that his intention was to attack; but it seemed very obvious the army had taken up a position upon the verge of the frontier, to occupy its lines of defence. As to the rest, Napoleon moved with his usual celerity, making reviews and inspecting the fortifications of the towns he traversed; and he lost no opportunity of shewing himself to his troops.

The army of the North, on arriving at Beaumont, formed its junction with the army of the

Ardennes, commanded by Vandamme, the head quarters of which were at Fumay. The army of the Moselle, under the orders of Gen. Girard, broke up from Metz by forced marches, and debouching at the same time by Philippeville, also came in line. Thus the army of the North was composed of five corps of infantry, commanded by the Lieutenant Generals d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and the Count de Lobau. The cavalry were divided into four corps, commanded by the Generals Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaud, and Kellerman, the whole under the orders of Marshal Grouchy.

The imperial guard, twenty thousand strong, formed the flower of this fine army, which was followed by a considerable train of artillery, perfectly well appointed, and in the best state, as also by several pontoon equipages. Independent of the cannon attached to each division, every corps d'armée had its own reserve parc; the guard, in particular, had a most magnificent train, almost entirely composed of new pieces.

This army, composed of choice soldiers and perfectly well organized, might form an effective force of one hundred and fifty thousand combatants, of which twenty thousand were cavalry, having in their train three hundred pieces of artillery.

But already, even in their own territory, these troops failed in that discipline, which

constitutes the chief force of an army, and becomes the safeguard of the country they occupy ; without regard for their unfortunate countrymen, who manifested the greatest zeal in furnishing them with subsistence, the French soldiers treated them with the greatest rigour, and considering pillage as an incontestable right, they made no scruple of giving themselves up to excess.

The houses every where were plundered ; and, under the pretext of searching for provisions, the soldiers broke open doors, maltreated the peasants, and seized upon every thing which suited their convenience. Thus running from house to house, from granary to granary, from cellar to cellar, the soldiers returned to their camp loaded with plunder.*

It is painful to acknowledge most of the officers but feebly opposed this disgraceful conduct, and almost tolerated it by saying,—
“ Why are there no magazines, the soldier must live ? ” When the soldier was allowed to provision himself, the officer, as may be believed, lived in luxury, and was only embarrassed in making a choice. Can we recognize in these traits, the eminently loyal, disinterested, generous, and delicate character of the French

* It is but justice to remark that this conduct, attributed to the French army, is generally discredited ;—indeed the author, in a preceding page, contradicts it himself, when he describes the army as *“ peaceable in its cantonments, but impatient to fight,”* &c.

officer? Certainly not; but other times bring other manners, and it belonged to the officers of Napoleon to exhibit to history a character peculiar to themselves.

However, in the midst of this crowd of devastators, a great many men were to be found full of honour and morality, who served with reluctance, and sighed to witness this shameful disorder; yet, carried away by the tide of events, they considered their conduct justifiable, under an illusion that the object of the war was to resist invasion. Hence, with the exclusive intention of fighting in defence of their country, they considered it a first duty to remain faithful at their posts.

It was, in fact, impossible to repress this excess, the soldier having reached that stage which is past all subordination; in general, the chiefs were animated with the best intentions, but they knew too well that such irregularities had always existed in the armies commanded by Napoleon, and were the principal means he used to endear himself to the soldiers, and to excite their courage.

The country the army traversed was covered with a rich harvest, displaying the highest state of cultivation; but woe to that district which lay in their route! Above all unfortunate were those places, which, by their situation, were most eligible for a camp! It seemed as if, from a motive of destruction, the most fertile

spots were always chosen. In a moment every thing disappeared, either by the trampling of feet, or under the stroke of the sickle, to furnish feed for the cavalry, or for the construction of huts.

The interior management of the army was disordered by acts of anarchy similar to those just described; it seemed that an implacable hatred animated the different corps against each other, and that open war existed between them. No urbanity, no confidence, no conduct worthy of warriors of the same nation; every where pride, egotism, and selfishness. Above all, there was not the least unanimity among the chiefs: when the commander of a column or regiment arrived upon the ground he was to occupy, he seized upon every thing, without any regard for those who might come after him. Guards were immediately posted in the houses which offered resources, and, without any other right than that of first occupier, opposed every sort of share in the provisions.—Very frequently those who were excluded, attacked the sentinels, and real combats ensued, where great numbers were wounded and some even killed.

The imperial guards, a kind of janissaries extremely arrogant with the other troops, were above all detested; and as they looked with contempt and disdain upon the other corps which fell in their way, so they, in their turn, were persecuted and tormented by the latter,

whenever they were not in sufficient force to give the law. The different corps of cavalry observed the same conduct towards each other, and insulted the infantry upon every occasion, who, in return, menaced the cavalry with their bayonets. Such was the spirit of the army. Thus advancing to the frontiers to protect their countrymen, they pillaged them every where.

However, the troops of all arms had made very long marches after they quitted their cantonments. The weather was stormy, but yet tolerably fine, and the roads sufficiently good for the passage of artillery and the trains. The movements were therefore made with a celerity which partook of precipitation. It was evident we were going to surprise the enemy by an unexpected appearance, and our rapid march gave rise to well-founded conjectures that a sudden irruption into Belgium was meditated. On the 14th of June, the army was united, and in line on the verge of the frontier.


Then the incertitude on the object of these manœuvres ceased, by the publication of the following proclamation, which was inserted in the orders of the army, and read at the head of each division and each regiment.

“SOLDIERS!—This day is the anniversary of
 “the battles of Marengo and of Friedland,
 “which twice decided the destinies of Europe.

Eu. 1027 9

Price Five Shillings.

on the night of the 17th June.



B S R
MÜNCHEN

FRENCH ACCOUNT

OF THE

LAST CAMPAIGN

OF

BUONAPARTE,

WRITTEN BY AN EYE-WITNESS.

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TRANSLATED BY CAPTAIN THORNTON, 78th Regt.

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WITH

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PRINTED FOR JAMES BLACK,

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1816.

Price Five Shillings.

Eur. 1027 9

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
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The national guards took up arms with the greatest alacrity, and the population were ready to rise en masse at the approach of the enemy: the same spirit manifested itself in all the departments, which had previously been invaded, and had become the theatre of the war in 1814, excepting the department of the North, which haughtily expressed opposite sentiments, and where the presence of the troops was supported with undissembled impatience. Not a single conscript could be collected in this department, and the national guards obstinately refused to march.

Nevertheless, the army reckoned on the cordial co-operation of the inhabitants, the moment hostilities should commence; and the inhabitants, in their turn, had the most entire confidence in the army, and generally believed the allies had only succeeded in invading France in 1814, in consequence of repeated treasons.

The commencement of the war, then, was looked for with perfect confidence; and the army, peaceable in its cantonments, but impatient to fight, only complained of the slowness of the allies in presenting themselves.

Such was the state of things when it was

understood the imperial guards had quitted Paris, after the ceremony of the Champ-de-Mai, and were directed, by forced marches, upon Laon; that Napoleon had followed this movement a few days after, and had repaired, in all haste, to the frontiers. In fact, he was seen to arrive at Vervins almost at the same moment with the guard; he there put himself at the head of his army, which had marched from its cantonments to concentrate: the passage of troops by Vervins and Avesnes was incessant for several days.

It remains yet to be explained by what means Napoleon succeeded in fascinating an immense population and the army, so that the former, without fear, saw all the calamities of war falling upon them, and the latter boldly faced all the forces of Europe; certain it is, wherever he appeared, he was received with the most lively and unanimous acclamations.

It was not generally supposed that his intention was to attack; but it seemed very obvious the army had taken up a position upon the verge of the frontier, to occupy its lines of defence. As to the rest, Napoleon moved with his usual celerity, making reviews and inspecting the fortifications of the towns he traversed; and he lost no opportunity of shewing himself to his troops.

The army of the North, on arriving at Beaumont, formed its junction with the army of the

Ardennes, commanded by Vandamme, the headquarters of which were at Fumay. The army of the Moselle, under the orders of Gen. Girard, broke up from Metz by forced marches, and debouching at the same time by Philippeville, also came in line. Thus the army of the North was composed of five corps of infantry, commanded by the Lieutenant Generals d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and the Count de Lobau. The cavalry were divided into four corps, commanded by the Generals Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaud, and Kellerman, the whole under the orders of Marshal Grouchy.

The imperial guard, twenty thousand strong, formed the flower of this fine army, which was followed by a considerable train of artillery, perfectly well appointed, and in the best state, as also by several pontoon equipages. Independent of the cannon attached to each division, every corps d'armée had its own reserve parc; the guard, in particular, had a most magnificent train, almost entirely composed of new pieces.

This army, composed of choice soldiers and perfectly well organized, might form an effective force of one hundred and fifty thousand combatants, of which twenty thousand were cavalry, having in their train three hundred pieces of artillery.

But already, even in their own territory, these troops failed in that discipline, which

constitutes the chief force of an army, and becomes the safeguard of the country they occupy ; without regard for their unfortunate countrymen, who manifested the greatest zeal in furnishing them with subsistence, the French soldiers treated them with the greatest rigour, and considering pillage as an incontestable right, they made no scruple of giving themselves up to excess.

The houses every where were plundered ; and, under the pretext of searching for provisions, the soldiers broke open doors, maltreated the peasants, and seized upon every thing which suited their convenience. Thus running from house to house, from granary to granary, from cellar to cellar, the soldiers returned to their camp loaded with plunder.*

It is painful to acknowledge most of the officers but feebly opposed this disgraceful conduct, and almost tolerated it by saying,—
“ Why are there no magazines, the soldier must live ? ” When the soldier was allowed to provision himself, the officer, as may be believed, lived in luxury, and was only embarrassed in making a choice. Can we recognize in these traits, the eminently loyal, disinterested, generous, and delicate character of the French

* It is but justice to remark that this conduct, attributed to the French army, is generally discredited ;—indeed the author, in a preceding page, contradicts it himself, when he describes the army as *“ peaceable in its cantonments, but impatient to fight,”* &c.

officer? Certainly not; but other times bring other manners, and it belonged to the officers of Napoleon to exhibit to history a character peculiar to themselves.

However, in the midst of this crowd of devastators, a great many men were to be found full of honour and morality, who served with reluctance, and sighed to witness this shameful disorder; yet, carried away by the tide of events, they considered their conduct justifiable, under an illusion that the object of the war was to resist invasion. Hence, with the exclusive intention of fighting in defence of their country, they considered it a first duty to remain faithful at their posts.

It was, in fact, impossible to repress this excess, the soldier having reached that stage which is past all subordination; in general, the chiefs were animated with the best intentions, but they knew too well that such irregularities had always existed in the armies commanded by Napoleon, and were the principal means he used to endear himself to the soldiers, and to excite their courage.

The country the army traversed was covered with a rich harvest, displaying the highest state of cultivation; but woe to that district which lay in their route! Above all unfortunate were those places, which, by their situation, were most eligible for a camp! It seemed as if, from a motive of destruction, the most fertile

spots were always chosen. In a moment every thing disappeared, either by the trampling of feet, or under the stroke of the sickle, to furnish feed for the cavalry, or for the construction of huts.

The interior management of the army was disordered by acts of anarchy similar to those just described; it seemed that an implacable hatred animated the different corps against each other, and that open war existed between them. No urbanity, no confidence, no conduct worthy of warriors of the same nation; every where pride, egotism, and selfishness. Above all, there was not the least unanimity among the chiefs: when the commander of a column or regiment arrived upon the ground he was to occupy, he seized upon every thing, without any regard for those who might come after him. Guards were immediately posted in the houses which offered resources, and, without any other right than that of first occupier, opposed every sort of share in the provisions.—Very frequently those who were excluded, attacked the sentinels, and real combats ensued, where great numbers were wounded and some even killed.

The imperial guards, a kind of janissaries extremely arrogant with the other troops, were above all detested; and as they looked with contempt and disdain upon the other corps which fell in their way, so they, in their turn, were persecuted and tormented by the latter,

whenever they were not in sufficient force to give the law. The different corps of cavalry observed the same conduct towards each other, and insulted the infantry upon every occasion, who, in return, menaced the cavalry with their bayonets. Such was the spirit of the army. Thus advancing to the frontiers to protect their countrymen, they pillaged them every where.

However, the troops of all arms had made very long marches after they quitted their cantonments. The weather was stormy, but yet tolerably fine, and the roads sufficiently good for the passage of artillery and the trains. The movements were therefore made with a celerity which partook of precipitation. It was evident we were going to surprise the enemy by an unexpected appearance, and our rapid march gave rise to well-founded conjectures that a sudden irruption into Belgium was meditated. On the 14th of June, the army was united, and in line on the verge of the frontier.

Then the incertitude on the object of these manœuvres ceased, by the publication of the following proclamation, which was inserted in the orders of the army, and read at the head of each division and each regiment.

“SOLDIERS!—This day is the anniversary of
 “the battles of Marengo and of Friedland,
 “which twice decided the destinies of Europe.

“ Then, as after the battles of Austerlitz and of
 “ Wagram, we were too generous. We be-
 “ lieved in the protestations and oaths of
 “ the Princes whom we had left on the throne.
 “ Now, however, united against us, they aim
 “ at the independence and the most sacred
 “ rights of France. They have commenced the
 “ most unjust of aggressions. Let us march
 “ then to meet them. We and they, are we no
 “ more the same men?

“ Soldiers! at Jena, against these same Prus-
 “ sians, now so arrogant, you were one against
 “ three; and at Montmirail, one against six.

“ Those among you, who have been prisoners
 “ of the English, will make them remember
 “ the dreadful evils which you suffered in their
 “ hulks.

“ The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians,
 “ the soldiers of the Confederation of the Rhine,
 “ mourn to be obliged to lend their arms in the
 “ cause of Princes, enemies of all justice and
 “ the rights of the people. They know that
 “ this coalition is insatiable. After swallowing
 “ up twelve million Poles, twelve million
 “ Italians, one million Saxons, six million
 “ Belgians, they would devour the German
 “ States of the second order.

“ The madmen! a moment of prosperity blinds
 “ them. The oppression and humiliation of the
 “ French is beyond their power; should they
 “ enter France, they will find there their grave.

“ Soldiers ! we have forced marches to make,
 “ battles to fight, and perils to encounter ; but
 “ with constancy and resolution the victory is
 “ ours ; the rights, the honour, the prosperity
 “ of the country, will be reconquered.

“ For every Frenchman who has a heart, this
 “ is the moment to conquer or to die.”

It is needless to say this proclamation was received by the soldiers with transports of joy and loud acclamations. The chiefs congratulated themselves on the rapidity of the marches, the combination and movements of which announced the presence of the great Napoleon !

On the 15th, at break of day, the army was in motion to invade Belgium. The 2d corps attacked the advanced posts of the Prussians which were opposed to them, and pursued them with vigour to Marchienne-au-pont ; the cavalry of this corps had occasion to charge several squares of infantry, which they broke, making some hundreds prisoners. The Prussians hastened to recross the Sambre.

The light cavalry of the centre, supported, on the route to Charleroi, this movement of the 2d corps, and sweeping away, by several successive charges, every thing that was upon the right bank of the Sambre, threw the enemy upon the other side of that river. While numerous light troops defended the approach to the bridge, the Prussians endeavoured to render

the passage of it impracticable, in order to retard our march, and to gain time for the evacuation of the town; but being pressed too hard, they succeeded only in doing such damage as was easily repaired. The sappers and pontooneers of the guard repaired there, and soon smoothed the difficulties which opposed our passage. The work was finished towards mid-day, when the light cavalry entered Charleroi, and took possession of it.

The 2d corps having effected the passage of the Sambre at Marchienne, advanced upon Gosselies, a large country town on the route to Brussels, with the intention of depriving the enemy's column, forced from Charleroi, of the means of retiring upon that point. The Prussians, surprised by an attack so brisk, and pursued by our light troops, retired in good order upon Fleurus, where their army concentrated.

Our van guard overtook the Prussians several times, and did not give them time to take up a position, but threw themselves with incredible impetuosity upon all the columns they came up with in a state to make resistance. The presence of Napoleon electrified the troops in such a way that nothing could restrain them; they ran upon the enemy without firing a shot, and charged into the middle of their masses with such fury, that nothing could resist their first shock.

The Emperor's squadrons of service charged several times upon the routed infantry; it was in one of these charges that General Letort, colonel of the guard, received a mortal wound.

At last, the French, after several obstinate and sanguinary combats, successively carried every position the enemy endeavoured to occupy. Towards night, the pursuit ceased; and Napoleon returned to Charleroi, where he fixed his head-quarters, after leaving the 3rd corps on the route of Namur, and the 2nd at Gosselies upon that of Brussels: the remainder of the army occupied the surrounding villages.

The results of these various engagements were a thousand prisoners, the passage of the Sambre, and the possession of Charleroi, where we found some magazines; but the most signal advantage was to keep up the spirit and stimulate the courage of the troops by a first success. Thus, according to Napoleon's plan, they set about making the most of it: the prisoners were formed into several columns, and marched in triumph upon the routes by which the corps in the rear filed off to the front. As they passed through the army, cries of "Vive l'Empereur" rent the air, and the soldiers gave themselves up to the most lively transports of joy:—this was accomplishing the object in view.

All the French army had not yet crossed

the Sambre, but every position they occupied was in the Belgian territory, and the troops found themselves among the new subjects of the king of the Low Countries; these people called upon us, with loud cries, as their deliverers, and assured us the whole country only waited our arrival to rise en masse in favour of our cause. We found, in fact, some groups of peasantry at the entrances of the villages, who came out to meet us with cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" but their acclamations did not seem generally very sincere.

However, notwithstanding these amicable demonstrations, the soldiers pillaged the inhabitants in every direction where the army marched. No sooner had the troops taken up a momentary position near any village, than they rushed down like a torrent on the unfortunate inhabitants; and provisions, furniture, clothing, disappeared in a moment. The following morning, when the camp broke up, the environs of the village (usually covered with rich meadows) seemed as if they had been desolated by showers of hail, or struck by lightning, in the places where fires had been burning.

When the troops marched, the wretched inhabitants reassembled, and collected the wrecks of their property.

From the best information we could obtain,

it seemed the Prussian posts had been surprised, and that the allies, so far from expecting an attack so brisk, and at the same time so serious, had proposed to invade the French territory in a few days. The inhabitants themselves were very much astonished at our appearance, at a moment when they believed us occupied in putting our frontiers in the best state of defence to guard against invasion. They spoke, generally, very much against the Prussians, whom they complained of as requiring too much, and for maltreating them daily.

From these reports, which offered nothing positive, every one had his suppositions as to the probable result of the campaign. Pursued with celerity, separated and every where turned, the Prussians could defend themselves but feebly. Baffled and disconcerted by an offensive movement he was far from expecting, Wellington found all his plan of campaign useless, because he could not fight upon the ground he had chosen. In fine, there was the most unbounded confidence in Napoleon, whose combinations were considered as certain as they were admirable. As to the English, their destruction, or a precipitate embarkation, was expected : then, there was nothing to be done, but to march to the banks of the Rhine, amidst the universal acclamations of the Belgians, risen en masse for their deliverance, and whose

entire army only waited for an opportunity to pass over to their old companions in arms. Such were the hopes and wishes of the French army!

On the 16th, at three o'clock in the morning, the columns of the French army, which were still on the right bank of the Sambre, were put in motion to effect their passage; after which, all the army moved forward.

The command of the left wing, composed of two corps of infantry, and four divisions of cavalry, was given to Marshal Ney, who had arrived the evening before at head-quarters. He received orders to march upon Gosselies and Frasnes by the causeway to Brussels.

The centre, constituting the main body of the army, was directed upon Fleurus; it was composed of the 3rd and 4th corps, having the 6th corps and the guard in reserve. Marshal Grouchy, with the horse of Pajol and some battalions of infantry, manœuvred towards the village of Sombref, upon the route to Namur.

On debouching from Fleurus, we soon discovered the Prussians; the main body of their army appeared drawn up in masses, and crowned the heights which surrounded the mill of Bussi; they extended themselves en amphithéâtre upon the whole length of the hill, in front of which was a deep ravine, studded with wood, and covering their whole

line. Their right was supported upon the village of Saint Amand, their centre upon Ligny, and their left, the termination of which the eye could not perceive, extended towards Sombref, and seemed prolonged indefinitely upon Gembloux and the causeway of Namur. All the villages were filled with infantry ; they were very large, situated in front of the ravine, and built upon irregular and intersected ground.

Napoleon having reconnoitred the enemy's position, immediately made his dispositions for the attack. The 1st corps, which formed part of Marshal Ney's force on the left, was posted with two divisions of heavy cavalry, in rear of the village of Frasnes, upon the right of the causeway to Brussels, and at a short distance from it: in this situation, they were ready to march upon any point where succour might be necessary. The 3rd corps, in columns of attack, were directed upon the village of Saint Amand ; the 4th and 6th corps, supported by the guard, and a numerous cavalry, advanced towards Ligny. Marshal Grouchy, upon his side, with the divisions of the right, approached Sombref.

The 3rd corps opened their fire by attacking the village of Saint Amand, which, after an obstinate combat, they carried by the bayonet, but were afterwards driven out after occupying a part ; the 4th corps, in their turn,

precipitated themselves upon Ligny; at the same time, the two wings successively engaged in the combat, the left wing at Frasnes and the right at Sombref; in a few moments, the affair became general, and a heavy cannonade, which gradually increased, was heard along the whole line.

The combat was supported on both sides with equal valour: it is impossible to give an idea of the fury which animated the soldiers of both parties, the one against the other; it seemed as if each of them had a personal injury to revenge, and had found, in his adversary, his most implacable enemy. The French would give no quarter, as they said the Prussians had vowed to put to death every Frenchman who fell into their hands: they had addressed this menace particularly to the guard, against whom they seemed greatly exasperated. In short, on both sides, the carnage was prodigious.

The contested villages were taken and retaken several times, after a most dreadful slaughter. Saint Amand and Ligny were above all disputed with invincible obstinacy. The French, however, succeeded in making a lodgment in the church-yard of the former, and maintained themselves there, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the Prussians to drive them from it; but, at one time, there was a terrible moment when the success was so far

compromised upon this point, that Napoleon sent, in all haste, for the 1st corps to reinforce it.

By this movement, the left wing was considerably weakened, after being warmly engaged against the English army, over which it had the advantage, and had beat back from the heights of Frasnes to the farm of Quatre-Bras; but the imprudence of Napoleon, in not informing Marshal Ney of the reduction he had made in his force, was very near occasioning the total loss of the battle.

The 1st corps had not marched above an hour towards Saint Amand, when the English army, considerably reinforced by the Prince of Orange, commenced, in their turn, the offensive, and vigorously repulsed our light troops and columns of attack. The English occupied all the edge of a large wood which is situated upon the left of the causeway to Brussels, having cavalry in the causeway itself. There was a hollow road, having the form of a ravine, the whole length of the edge of the wood, and level ground of pretty large extent and covered with rye, separated this wood from the Brussels causeway; the right of the causeway, to a certain height, was occupied by the French.

All on a sudden, this level ground was covered by numerous battalions, in squares, supported by a formidable cavalry, which advanced with assurance, and threatened to break

through our line. Our troops seemed intimidated, and retired with a kind of dread. The moment was pressing; it was necessary to call up, with all haste, the reserves. Marshal Ney, however, was little alarmed at these demonstrations of the enemy, because he depended upon the 1st corps; he sent orders for them to march to the front at the charge step, and to throw themselves upon the enemy;—but what was his astonishment and extreme embarrassment to find Napoleon had disposed of them!

He ordered the 8th and 11th regiments of curassiers, which were at hand, to charge the foremost battalions. This charge was made with the greatest bravery; but those battalions, supported by a wood filled with infantry, threw together such a terrible fire, that the balls and grape shot went through and through; and the curassiers not being able to break the squares, they were obliged to go to the right about, and retire in disorder. It was in this brave but unfortunate charge that a curassier of the 11th regiment, took a colour from an English regiment of the line.

This retrograde movement was made to a considerable extent, and the crowd of curassiers and wounded soldiers which ran back, soon spread a panic in the rear of the army: the equipages, the convoys, the domestics, in short, all that crowd of non-combatants in the

train of armies, saved themselves precipitately (drawing with them every thing they met) across the fields and in the causeway to Charleroi, which was soon in confusion. The route was complete and spread with rapidity ; every one ran in the greatest disorder, crying out, " There's the enemy ! there's the enemy ! "

However, the evil was not so great as was at first imagined, or at least it was promptly repaired. General Roussel's division of curassiers moved forward, at a quick trot, against the English, and reanimated the fugitives by their presence ; but they had no occasion to charge. Our infantry retired in close order and perfectly steady ; they opposed a vigorous resistance, and by little and little re-established the combat. After retiring to the heights above Frasnes, they reoccupied their old positions, and compelled to relinquish all movements in advance, they only fought during the rest of the day to maintain themselves there : in a short time order was restored upon the rear of the army, and the runaways halted, when they knew for certain they would not be pursued.

However, the 1st corps, detached from the left wing, had been useless ; for when they arrived, the 3d corps had already carried the village of Saint Amand. They received then the order to return to the position they had just quitted, and thus marching over the field of battle with shouldered arms, from the left

to the right, and from the right to the left, they were useful upon no point.

The fire was kept up with vivacity upon the whole line, particularly towards Ligny, where the strongest force was directed, and the greatest efforts were made. The cannonade did not cease an instant, and, to all appearance, our artillery made the greatest havoc, as the Prussian battalions were in close column on the hills (which rise en amphithéâtre,) and upon the level ground where they terminate; they were also quite uncovered, and exposed to all the shot from the numerous artillery upon our line. On the other hand, our troops, being almost all hid by the sinuosities of the ground, were infinitely less exposed to the effects of the Prussian artillery; their fire, nevertheless, answered to ours with the greatest perseverance, but with less success.

About seven o'clock in the evening we became masters of the villages, but the Prussians still preserved the positions in rear of the ravine. Napoleon, from the commencement of the affair, had been manœuvring in such a way that he had the power, at the proper moment, to direct a superior force beyond the ravine, in order to drive the Prussian masses from the heights which they occupied above the mill of Bussi: it was then at this moment that he directed his guard and all his reserve upon the village of Ligny. This bold movement, which had been

retarded by what had passed upon the left, had for object completely to cut off from the rest of their army the right of the Prussians, which was posted behind Saint Amand, and to shut them out from a retreat upon Namur. All the guard marched forward at the charge step, supported by a numerous cavalry and a formidable artillery; they traversed the village, and rushed into the ravine, which they crossed in the midst of a shower of musketry and grape shot; then the fire, which seemed to have ceased for a moment, recommenced with redoubled violence; a frightful combat ensued at the moment when the guard rushed from the ravine, and charged the Prussian squares with fixed bayonets. The Prussians sustained the shock with resolute bravery; but nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French grenadiers, who every where cleared a passage with the most horrible carnage: charges of cavalry were made at the same moment, in one place or other, and caused a dreadful confusion. At last, after a most obstinate and exasperating resistance, the Prussians were forced on every side, and retired, leaving us in possession of the field of battle, covered with dead, wounded, and prisoners, with several pieces of cannon. The guard immediately occupied the level ground, which the enemy had abandoned, and the cavalry commenced the pursuit.

While this decisive operation was taking place

at Ligny, the 3d corps endeavoured to amuse the right wing of the Prussians, with a view of making them lose sight of the affair, the object of which was to uncover them; but the snare was too obvious to escape their observation. They regulated their movements by those of the main body; in short, from this moment the Prussians decided upon a retreat at all points, and their army only fought to support the precipitate march of their columns to the rear, which filed off in order, and without impediment, upon Gembloux and Namur.

The French army were about to follow up their success, when the approach of night, and the fatigues of the day, prevented them; after crossing the ravine, and seizing upon all the positions of the enemy, the troops went into bivouac. At ten o'clock the fire had ceased upon the whole line.

Various reports were circulated in the army respecting the battle of Ligny, but almost all contradictory; indeed the results of this battle were never well known. At first it was thought the Prussian army was totally destroyed, as twenty-five thousand of their dead remained on the field of battle, and they had lost an equal number of prisoners. According to the first accounts, Blucher was killed, and his army in such complete deroute, that Marshal Grouchy wrote he collected more prisoners, cannon, and equipages, than he wished.

The fact is, Marshal Blucher had a horse killed under him at the commencement of the retreat, and being overthrown by the fall of the animal, under which he remained, he found himself surrounded by the French curassiers, and only owed his safety to the obscurity of the night, which prevented the curassiers from perceiving him during the tumult of the charge. It is also certain, that the French stormed the positions of the Prussians, and, according to all appearance, the latter suffered prodigiously; but it was never known for certain what loss they sustained; hence we may presume it was not so considerable as was reported: for this reason, there was no general order to the army on this affair. As to the rest, the field of battle was choked up with Prussian dead, the number of killed being enormous on their side; but, excepting the wounded, we made very few prisoners.

Though the combat had been less murderous upon the left, it was nevertheless spirited, and the English appeared to have lost many men: but both parties remained on the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action. It was said the Duke of Brunswick was killed by the fire of the division under the orders of Jerome Buonaparte, and the death of the English General Hill was also reported. The former news was confirmed the following day, and gave the French Generals an oppor-

tunity to ingratiate themselves with the Ex-king of Westphalia, by indulging in some pleasantries on the fatality that pursued this unfortunate Duke of Brunswick, and which, by opposing him constantly to the conqueror of his states, condemned him as it were to die by his hand: hence they argued it was easy to divine who was to be his successor. It was also said that Jerome had been struck by a spent ball: without searching for the truth of this report, it is well to remark, that these kind of balls are only made for great personages, as a set-off to their valour.

There was also much murmuring in Marshal Ney's corps against the charge of the curassiers, to the failure of which, all the misfortunes that had happened, was attributed; they were accused of not having effectually charged the enemy's battalions, in the midst of which, however, they had captured a colour—they were even suspected of treason. These reports were soon spread throughout the army, and produced a gloom on the minds of the soldiers; it was immediately rumoured, that several Generals,* who had proved traitors, had been delivered over to a military commission, and shot.

Though the bloody battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras had not the decisive results which signalize a great victory, yet they were regarded

* The name of General Bourmont was mentioned as one of them.

of very great importance relative to the ulterior events of the campaign. Every one supposed that Napoleon had accomplished the object he had in view, that is, of completely separating the English and Prussian armies, and cutting off all communication between them. This advantage seemed very precious, as a weak corps was sufficient to observe and follow up the Prussians after the severe losses they had sustained, which allowed the French army to operate solely against the English.

It was with this intention, that, on the 17th, at day-break, Napoleon marched with his reserve and the 6th corps towards Quatre-Bras, after leaving the 3d and 4th corps, with the cavalry of General Pajol, under the orders of Marshal Grouchy, to follow up the Prussians.

The English appeared to occupy the same ground they had taken up the evening before: Napoleon was engaged in reconnoitring it, and the French army remained in observation till eleven o'clock in the morning, to wait for the troops on the right, who were placed in position as fast as they arrived. It rained incessantly, and the cross roads, which former rains had already cut up, became more and more impracticable for artillery.

All the dispositions for attack were made, and the French masses united advanced in line on the heights of Frasnes, when it was perceived the English had manœuvred to mask a

retreat, (doubtless determined by the result of the affair of Ligny,) to which they had devoted a part of the night, as well as the time we had employed to concentrate our forces in the morning. The troops, which we saw in front of the wood, and in the high road, were nothing more than a strong rear guard, destined to support this movement, and which they also followed, when the main body had filed off; Napoleon immediately commenced the pursuit with his cavalry, and the march of the army was accelerated towards Brussels.

During this rapid march, the ardour of the troops was incredible; they only saw, in the able and well-conducted retreat of the English, a deroute which would not cease till they had regained their shipping. Already it was hoped they would fight no more, and, left to their own force, would abandon Brussels, and march, with all haste, to their ships. The infantry, artillery, and equipages of the army, filed off in confusion and with precipitation upon the route, covered with a thick and black mud, whilst the cavalry marched on the flanks through fields overspread with a rich harvest, which was soon reduced to chaff. The horses sunk up to their bellies in a black soft adhesive earth, and could extricate themselves only by immense efforts, which considerably retarded the march, and made it very painful. We found here and there

some English ammunition waggons and carriages, with their wheels broken, which the enemy had abandoned.

We traversed the field of battle of Quatre-Bras;—it was covered with dead and wreck;—among the rest, we found a good many wounded French, who had never been carried off. It was easy to perceive how murderous the affair had been for both parties; but, according to appearances, the English had lost many more men than we; the level ground, which separates the causeway from the wood where they were in position, and particularly the edge of the wood with the hollow road within it, were hid under heaps of dead, most of which were Scotch.

Napoleon, with his advanced guard, pursued the enemy till night fall, and did not halt till he arrived in front of the forest of Soignes, where the English made such a resistance as he despaired to overcome that day. After having cannonaded and harassed them till dusk, he made his troops take up a position, and fixed his head-quarters at a farm, called Caillu, near Plunchenoit. The main body of the army encamped at Genappe, and in its environs.

The night was dreadful; a continued rain fell in torrents, and caused the army to suffer cruel privations—the troops were in bivouac in the midst of muddy ground, overspread with wet

corn, and they had not time to construct any shelter.

It was generally believed, the English army would devote the night to continue its movement of retreat; in consequence, we expected to arrive at Brussels the following day: thus every one congratulated himself in considering the campaign as finished, because we believed ourselves already masters of Brussels, and that Marshal Grouchy (who was to sleep at Namur) could not fail to reach Liege at the same time that Napoleon arrived in the capital of the Low Countries. Some pretended deserters, who were nothing better than spies, assured us that the whole of the Belgians waited only for an action to pass over to our side; but this disposition being known, they were constantly kept in the rear; they added, that since the commencement of hostilities, there was so much difficulty in keeping them together, that, notwithstanding the precautions taken, they expected to see them fall suddenly upon the Prussians, whom they hated most sincerely.

However this may be, day had no sooner dawned, than the French army took to their arms, and were much surprised to find the enemy had not only preserved his positions, but seemed still very well disposed to defend them. Napoleon had made it appear, that he was apprehensive the English would escape him during the night; he was therefore very well

satisfied to find them in the morning; and the moment he heard of it, he could not contain his joy, but exclaimed to those about him, “*Ah! these English, I have them at last!*”

Without troubling himself more, he urged, with that imprudent impatience which characterizes him, the march of the columns which were in the rear; and without any other information, without knowing the positions or the force of his enemy, without being certain the Prussian army was effectually kept in check by Marshal Grouchy, he resolved to attack immediately.

The French army, which consisted of four corps of infantry, including the guard, and in three corps of cavalry, might present an effective force of one hundred and twenty thousand combatants, and were assembled about ten o'clock upon the heights parallel to those occupied by the English army. The English were seen in position upon the level ground in front of the forest of Soignes, that forest being their point of support. We could perceive towards the centre, in rear of the village of Mont St. Jean, large bodies of infantry which crowned a vast plateau: this plateau extends on both sides along the edge of the forest, but diminishes considerably in width; it was covered with artillery. The right of the English army was supported upon the village of Merke Braine, having in front the chateau and farm of Hougoumont (Goumont)

surrounded with a wood intersected by several ravines, and deep sinuosities ; their left extended far towards Wavre, covered also by a ravine, and the farm of Haye-Saint.

In general, except upon the high level ground, which was considered as the centre of the English army, we saw but few troops ; yet ought we not to have supposed, as was found out for certain during the affair, that they were hid in the hollows and ravines which separated the position from the forest, and in the forest itself ?

The head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington were at Waterloo, in the rear of his lines, which were so established as to cross the two great causeways of Brussels and Nivelles.

Scarcely were the French troops in position, when Napoleon sent orders for the firing to commence. He had posted himself on a small round hill, situated upon the right of the causeway, from whence he could discover the movements of both armies. He walked alone, with his arms crossed upon his breast, at a small distance from his staff, who were grouped behind him. The weather was tempestuous, with flying showers ; it continued so during the day.

The 2d corps were posted on the left, and marched against Hougomont. The 1st corps supported their left on the causeway, and marched upon the centre ; the 6th corps were

on the right. The guard were in reserve on the heights. The cavalry were divided upon different points, but the strongest columns were upon the wings, particularly the right wing.

Towards mid-day, the artillery opened their fire from the French lines, and numerous light troops were pushed forward to bring on the action.

The left vigorously attacked the farm of Hougomont, where the walls and buildings had been loop-holed by the infantry, which occupied them in force, and who fought with extreme obstinacy. Some battalions and squadrons, at the same time, marched against the troops, posted in solid bodies, behind this farm, into which they were continually sending reinforcements. After an hour's combat, the English seemed to recede a little, and the French army concentrated their approaches; the artillery moved forward upon the whole line, and the columns followed. It was soon given out that strong columns were about to march with fixed bayonets against the position of Mont St. Jean, whilst the cavalry on the wings were to charge the enemy's artillery, which was least supported. We waited with impatience for this grand movement, from which the most complete success was expected; but it was retarded by the obstinate efforts of the English to maintain themselves in the buildings, which covered

their wings. They incessantly directed fresh battalions towards the farms of Hougoumont and Haye-Saint, which our cavalry dispersed on several occasions; but though these farms were pressed with unequalled vigour, and without a moment's pause, they continued to hold out. Impatient at not being able to dislodge the troops which occupied the chateau and garden of Hougoumont, and who seemed determined not to yield, it was decided to set fire to the buildings; at the same time, fresh forces were sent against Haye-Saint, who at last seized upon it, after a very long and murderous combat. Upon every point the struggle was kept up with the same ardour, and the artillery made dreadful ravages.

The two advanced points of support of the English position being carried, the French army passed the ravine, and approached the position, which vomited upon them a deluge of grape shot and musketry: the charges of cavalry, which had been ordered, were no longer delayed. Very formidable columns of infantry advanced against Mont St. Jean, where the most terrible fire overwhelmed them. The French cavalry charged, at the same time, the main positions, in order to carry off the cannon, but they were in their turn assailed by the enemy's cavalry, who rushed in mass from the ravines, where they were hid; successive charges were made, and had no other result than a horrible

carnage. The affair was supported, the attack did not slacken upon any point; fresh columns advanced, and the charges were renewed:—thrice the position was on the point of being forced; and thrice, after prodigies of valour, the French were arrested.

There was then a hesitation and strong fears in the French army; some dismounted batteries retired; numerous wounded detached themselves from the columns, and spread alarm on the issue of the battle; a profound silence had succeeded to the acclamations and joyful cries of the soldiers, sure of marching to victory. Excepting the infantry of the guard, all the troops were seen engaged and exposed to a most murderous fire; the battle still continued with the same violence, and yet had no result.

It was near seven o'clock: Napoleon still remained upon the little hill where he had posted himself, from whence he could very well perceive what was passing; he contemplated with a stern look the hideous spectacle of this sanguinary conflict. The more the obstacles increased, the more he seemed obstinate. He was indignant at the unexpected difficulties he met with, and far from fearing to push to extremity an army whose confidence in him was without bounds, he did not cease to send on fresh troops, to give the order to march forward, to charge with the bayonet, to carry

every thing. Several times he was given to understand, from various points, that the affair looked bad, that the troops seemed disheartened : *forward !* replied he, *forward !*

A General sent to inform him he found himself in a position he could not maintain, as his troops were under the fire of artillery ; he asked, at the same time, what he should do to support himself against this artillery. “ *Seize upon it,*” he replied, and turned his back upon the aide-de-camp.

An English officer, wounded and a prisoner, was brought before him ; he endeavoured to gain intelligence from him, and among other questions, he inquired what was the strength of the English army : the officer replied, it was very numerous, and had just received a reinforcement of sixty thousand men. *So much the better,* said he, *the more there are, the more we shall beat.* He caused several couriers to start with dispatches which he dictated to a secretary, and repeated several times, with distraction, “ *Let them not forget every where to say, the victory is mine.*”

It was just at this moment, when all his attempts were foiled, information was sent that some Prussian columns were marching upon our right flank, and menacing our rear ; but he would never believe in these reports, and replied several times, that the scouts had kept a bad look out, and that these pretended

Prussians could be no other than the corps of Grouchy. He was soon, however, compelled to credit this information, when the Prussian columns made a brisk attack upon our right wing. A part of the 6th corps was sent to support this new shock, till the arrival of the divisions under Grouchy, on whose aid we always reckoned; indeed, it was reported they were already in line.

After the battle of the 16th, it seems that a part of the army of Marshal Blucher, which were concentrated in the environs of Wavre, had succeeded in masking their march from Marshal Grouchy, and being joined by the 4th Prussian corps, commanded by Bulow, they had marched, with all haste, to the English lines, to support the Duke of Wellington.

Napoleon is of an inflexibility of temper which no circumstances can change. Having judged the moment was arrived for deciding the fate of the day, he formed a fourth column of attack, almost entirely composed of the guard, and directed them, at the *pas de charge*, against the heights of Mont Saint Jean, sending at the same time instructions that this movement should be seconded upon the whole line, as the victory depended on its success.

These old warriors approached the position with that intrepidity which might be expected of them: the whole army recovered their vigour, and the combat was renewed upon every part

of the line. The guard made repeated charges, but their efforts were constantly repulsed; overwhelmed by a dreadful artillery which seemed to increase, these invincible grenadiers saw their ranks mown down by grape shot: they closed up quickly and without fear; they marched forward without being intimidated: nothing could arrest them but death or severe wounds, but—the hour of defeat had already sounded—enormous masses of infantry, supported by an immense cavalry, (against which we had nothing to oppose, as ours was entirely destroyed,) fell upon them with fury, surrounded them on every side, and summoned them to surrender:—*The guard never surrender, they die,** was the reply. No quarter was then given; almost all fell under the sabre, or the bayonet, fighting with desperation. This dreadful carnage lasted as long as there was any resistance. At last, overpowered by numbers, and braving, in vain, a certain death, they quitted their ranks and rushed back in disorder towards their first positions, doubtless with the intention of rallying there.

While these events were passing in the centre, the Prussian columns continued to advance upon our right, and to press with ardour the few troops they found there. The cannonade and a brisk fire of musketry were heard from the rear of that line, and seemed to approach

* This fine reply is generally believed to have proceeded from General Cambronne.

nearer and nearer. Our troops supported the combat as much as possible, but they gradually lost ground. At last our right wing retrograded in a very sensible degree, and the Prussians, who overwhelmed them, were on the point of debouching upon the causeway.

When it was known that the guard had been repulsed, and we saw their dispersed and shattered battalions retire with precipitation, a general terror spread throughout the army; the soldiers disbanded upon every point, and each individual sought his safety by flight. In vain did the despairing Napoleon gather together some battalions, of the young and old guard, who had never yet been engaged, and lead them on against the enemy, already marching in mass from his positions; all was useless: alarmed by what was passing around them, and run down by the fugitives, this feeble reserve was soon overthrown.

At the same instant, the army spontaneously quitted their positions, and rushed down like a torrent: the cannoneers abandoned their pieces; the drivers cut the traces of their horses; infantry, cavalry, all arms, were mixed and confounded, and only presented an unformed mass which nothing could stop, every one escaping as well as he could, by the causeways or across the fields. This movement was followed by the trains, and a crowd of equipages, upon the sides of the route and in

it, rushing against each other with a confusion impossible to describe.

No point to rally upon had been given, and it was now impossible to cause any command to be heard; the generals and other chiefs were separated from their corps, being lost and dragged on by the crowd; there did not exist a single battalion, behind which it was possible to rally: as not the smallest arrangement had been made for a retreat, how was it possible to remedy such a complete defeat?

The guard, that firm phalanx, which, in the greatest catastrophes, had always been the rallying point for the army, and had served as its rampart: the guard, the terror of the enemy, had at last been destroyed, and their remains dispersed with the multitude.

Every one escaped as well as he could; they pushed, they pressed, and those who ran the best were the foremost; groups, more or less numerous, were formed and passively followed those in front. Some durst not diverge from the route, but endeavoured to clear a passage through the equipages with which it was covered: others, on the contrary, considered it dangerous, and betook themselves to the right or left, according as their ideas of the danger directed them. Fear exaggerated their terrors, and the night, without being very obscure, considerably augmented the disorder.

The enemy, who perceived the astonishing

confusion and overthrow of our army, hastened to take advantage of it, and detached immediately a numerous cavalry in pursuit. Formidable columns advanced upon our flanks, whilst squadrons of cavalry charged upon the causeway and fell at unawares upon the trains and equipages, which had not time to file off. Most of Napoleon's own carriages, with a great quantity of baggage, which remained at the farm where he had slept, became the booty of the Prussians. All the cannon in position on the field of battle, with their ammunition waggon, remained upon the ground where they had manœuvred, and fell into the hands of the enemy. In less than half an hour, all the material of the army had disappeared.

The English and Prussians having completely formed their junction, the two generals in chief, Wellington and Blucher, met at the farm of Belle-Alliance, and concerted together on the best means of following up their success. The English had suffered considerably during the action; their cavalry, particularly, were immensely fatigued and effectually *hors de poursuite*: the Prussian cavalry, therefore, being quite fresh, made haste to take the lead, and followed us up very close.

The mass of fugitives, thus pressed, soon overran the space of two leagues, which separates the field of battle from Genappe, and on reaching this small town, most of them ex-

pected to pass the night there without being attacked.

In order to oppose some obstacles to the advance of the enemy, the principal street of the town was barricadoed with carriages, wag-gons, &c. and a few pieces of cannon were placed in battery. Some bivouacs were established in the environs of the town, and the soldiers dispersed to seek an asylum and food in the houses; but hardly were these dispositions completed when the enemy presented himself; some cannon shot fired upon his advanced guard of cavalry, every where spread the alarm; the camp was broken up in an instant, all fled, and the disorderly retreat recommenced with more trouble and confusion than ever.

In the midst of these misfortunes, Napoleon had disappeared, and no one knew what had become of him. When this news was told to a celebrated general officer, he exclaimed, like Megret, after the death of Charles XII. at Friederickstadt, "*Behold the piece finished.*" Some said he had charged several times at the head of the guard, and being dismounted, was made prisoner. The same incertitude prevailed respecting the fate of Marshal Ney, the major-general, and most of the generals in chief.

All night the French army continued their disastrous march, leaving the causeway overspread with wreck, and each instant assailed by charges of cavalry which completed their

disorganization. The panic which presided at this defeat, was such, that numerous bodies of cavalry and infantry, well armed, could not be made to face a few contemptible lancers, upon whom it was only sufficient to turn, to defeat.

At day-break, the sad remains of our army arrived, part at Charleroi, and part at Marchienne, where they hastened to recross the Sambre.

This unfortunate army, of late so brilliant, but, now in a shattered state and harassed with fatigue, presented an appearance the most hideous;—numbers of wounded, pale, beaten, covered with bloody tatters with which they had bound up their wounds, had followed on foot or mounted upon the horses of the trains; and straggling in the midst of a confused column, which covered the whole breadth of the causeway, they vividly called to the imagination the sad scenes of carnage which had just passed.

As the equipages approached the Sambre, they were retarded in their march by those in front, and jumbled together in the roads which meet at the bridges of Charleroi and Marchienne. The enemy's cavalry soon made their appearance, and surprised them in the midst of this confusion:—then each individual thought only of escaping; the frightened waggoners cut the traces of their horses, and followed by all

around, threw themselves in disorder upon the bridges and along the banks of the river, to seek a passage. Thus all that remained of artillery and material of every kind, fell into the power of the enemy, who also took a great number of prisoners.

All the army that had previously recrossed the Sambre, thought they might rally on the other side of that river; and, in consequence, had established bivouacs in the vineyards and meadows which are upon the right bank of that river; but when they were advertised of the approach of the enemy, by the extreme confusion his presence caused, the bivouacs were broke up, and the troops went off with all haste. Without waiting for any order, without endeavouring to destroy the bridges, or make the slightest reconnoissance of the enemy, all went off at once, and each took his own direction, without thinking how it might end.

At a short distance from Charleroi there are two routes, one goes to Avesnes, the other to Philippeville. Having no instructions which road to take, and no General being at hand, the army separated into two divisions; the most numerous took the route by which they advanced, and marched upon Avesnes; the others proceeded by the left-hand route, and moved upon Philippeville. A great many fugitives threw themselves into the adjacent woods, with no other design than to avoid the enemy's cavalry: thus

the army dispersed more and more, and almost entirely disappeared.

The route Napoleon chose to retire by was through Philippeville, Rocroi, and Mezières.

Thousands of soldiers wandering about in uncertainty, and quitting the woods in crowds, spread themselves over the country, and raised the alarm every where. The unfortunate inhabitants were in despair to hear, almost at the same moment, of the success and irreparable defeat of the French army, and to find themselves a prey to an enemy rendered still more ferocious by a dear-bought victory, and at a time too when they expected the theatre of the war was far removed from them. Every where the fortresses hastily closed their gates, and refused admittance to the unfortunate soldiers; in consequence, they were obliged to seek for quarters in the neighbouring hamlets, where they committed every sort of excess.

A crowd of fugitives, oppressed with pain and despair, who were refused admittance into Philippeville, spread the deplorable news, that the Emperor was blockaded in that town; this information, however, was soon contradicted, for his Majesty remained there only a few hours, and then directed his route upon Mezières. It was nearly night when he passed under the walls of Rocroi, where every one supposed he would halt; a great proportion of the inhabitants were upon the ramparts, and received him

with cries of “Vive l’ Empereur !” which continued while he was in sight. No one entered the town, except a few artillery officers and some persons of his suite, who had escaped the disaster : only a few horses remained ; all the carriages and equipages had been seized by the enemy.

The numerous corps of the army which had directed their march upon Avesnes and Laon, had also the most painful anxiety for the fate of Napoleon ; upon this point more than any other, they were entirely ignorant of what had befallen him. Not being in the midst of them, the troops were persuaded he had sunk on the field of honour, where he had conducted so many brave men to death, and were deploring the cruel destiny reserved for a chief so dear, when they understood he had reached Paris in safety and good health.

Since the affair of Ligny, we had never been in communication with the right of our army, composed of the corps of Grouchy ; though we expected to find this Marshal upon the Sambre, yet there was no news of him during the retreat. We were, therefore, ignorant upon which point his corps had retired, and the most distressing reports were circulated respecting them. It was said, that, not being informed in time of the issue of the battle of Mont St. Jean, they had been surrounded by the Allies near Wavre, during the night and morning of the 18th and 19th, and finding it impossible to retreat, they were

compelled, after an obstinate resistance, to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion: Vandamme was included among the killed. Thus, according to these data, our army might be considered as totally annihilated.

Thus this fine French army had ceased to exist; an army re-formed out of the wrecks of so many brilliant armies which Napoleon had already sacrificed. His conduct during this short and unfortunate campaign might well justify the opinion that he wished to witness the ruin of his army; but their destruction is rather to be attributed to his imperious and rash commands, and to the incorrigible mania of constantly advancing, with a blind confidence, without plan, and without calculating any chance.

From a knowledge of this system of war, adopted and constantly followed by Napoleon, it is very evident that the enemy laid the snare into which he precipitated himself with such a woeful security; their bulletins state that the position of Mont St. Jean had been reconnoitred and prepared as the ground where they proposed to entice the army of Napoleon, and to give him battle.

In short, a man must be a Napoleon not to perceive it. The regular retreat of the English upon such a fine position—the obstinacy they manifested to maintain it—the facility they had of masking troops and artillery

in an immense forest—these are considerations which would have inspired in any other General a well-founded opinion that this was not a position of chance, but had been pitched upon before-hand. At all events, did not prudence require the country to be reconnoitred, and the dispositions of the enemy to be sounded? and the most inexperienced General, would he have attacked without first being in communication with his right wing, or without, at least, being aware of what might be the result of his operations?

Even supposing we had succeeded in forcing the English, what very great advantage was to be expected from it? had they not behind them a forest which covered a space of fifteen leagues in length, and five in breadth? and the route which runs through it, ought it not to be considered as a very narrow pass, where ten thousand men and a few pieces of cannon might arrest the strongest force? Was it, then, indispensable to carry in front a position naturally strong, and was it absolutely impossible to turn it?

Such are the questions that occur to any man the least instructed in the art of war, and which, indeed, are suggested on a view of the ground at first sight; but Napoleon was obstinate in seeing upon Mont St. Jean nothing but a numerous rear-guard, which, already intimidated, only put on a good face to give time to the trains to file through the forest. He firmly

believed he should not have to fight, but merely to continue the pursuit.

He would neither believe his eyes, nor listen to the observations of some of his Generals, who recommended him to let the English evacuate the forest unmolested ; or at least, to wait till the following day to attack them, if they had not effected their retreat by that time. After being fatigued by long and painful marches, and exposed to a continued rain all night, the troops are scarcely collected, than, without a moment's repose, he precipitates them upon the enemy. Persuaded that nothing can resist them, he makes them attack in front an impregnable position ; and, disdaining to direct a few manœuvres, to make the approach less perilous, he gives them up, with indifference, to a murderous fire. Soon he is indignant at the resistance opposed to him, and at last, in his delirium, he determines at once to break through the enemy's line ; for this purpose, he orders to the front all his cavalry, and makes them charge to the utmost. In less than half an hour the whole had perished, overthrown by the enemy's cavalry, or overwhelmed by showers of grape shot. Thus in sacrificing them to his imperious will, he deprived himself of the means of following up the English, had he succeeded in defeating them.

Instead of being convinced, by the enormous losses he sustained, of the force and de-

signs of the enemy, and of the necessity of taking measures against compromising the safety of the whole army; he descended furiously from the height where he had directed the operations, and putting himself at the head of his guard, never ceased urging them to acts which were impracticable, till at last, overturned and lost in the crowd of combatants, they, as it were, vanished from before him, and disappeared in the midst of the carnage.

From this moment, all was lost; the destruction of the French army was inevitable; they were turned upon the right, and nothing was prepared for a retreat. Who would believe it? Napoleon alone was not convinced of the dangers which menaced him; he was still for marching forward, and collecting all the forces that remained to renew his attempts on the centre. Oh, inconceivable misconduct! he hoped with a few battalions to overthrow forces which had withstood the shock of his whole army!

However, there is no doubt Napoleon exerted all his abilities in the battle of Mont St. Jean, and he had but too much at stake not to display all his means to ensure the victory. Hence we are in the alternative of avowing that he owes all his victories to chance, or that he was not himself on the 18th of June; his combinations on that day cannot be deemed good, unless we attribute to him the formal intention of

sacrificing his army: this is certainly the opinion of many able Generals, very capable of appreciating his conduct, who, during the battle, could not contain their astonishment and indignation, but cried aloud,—“ This man is not the same! What would he? He has lost his senses!”

However, setting aside any consideration on the nature of the ground, some pretend to say that his method of attack, and the movements he caused to be executed, resembled greatly the manœuvres at the battle of Marengo, and that it is very probable the victory would have been ours;—yes, doubtless; if suddenly a formidable column, commanded by a Dessaix, had risen from the ground, to charge the victorious English at the moment they rushed from their positions to fall upon us.

Every one allows that when Napoleon saw the affair look bad, he charged with great bravery at the head of his guard, had two horses killed under him, and threw himself several times into the midst of the English, to seek his death. This act of despair contributes materially to prove that he has not the least capacity to manage a retreat, and that at Mont St. Jean, as every where else, his tactic is solely confined to the object of risking all to break through his enemy. Hence we may account for the astonishing disasters which have constantly signalized his defeats.

It is impossible then to help deploring the fate of an army delivered over to the discretion of a man, whose temper of mind is characterized by such invincible obstinacy, that he will acknowledge no obstacles, and who only gives his army the alternative of victory or death. Such inconsiderate bravery is very censurable in a General, who owes himself entirely to the safety of his army. But has Napoleon ever devoted himself to that object? If we reply in the affirmative, (and it is impossible to deny that he has frequently faced danger with the greatest bravery, and even with rashness,) we are consequently constrained to acknowledge in his character two beings essentially different; the one, brave, audacious, exposing life without reserve in the midst of combats, and determined to finish it gloriously in the field of honour; the other, pusillanimous, and pursued incessantly with the fear of death. If, in one character he has been courageous on the field of battle, and remained firm and immovable in the midst of the dreadful scenes which surrounded him; in the other he has trembled at the aspect of danger, and, on critical occasions, been seized with a panic which insensibly led him into a shameful flight.

His unfortunate soldiers, more careful than himself of his glory, did not know better how to express their attachment for him, than by hoping he had remained on the field of battle.

If he was but dead! said they. In vain did some speak of him as a Sovereign, and endeavour to point out the distinction between his duties and those of a simple General: nothing was seen in this reasoning but a subterfuge to gloss over a flight so disgraceful.

However this may be, the battle of Mont St. Jean was one of the most murderous that has ever been fought. The French army, composed of one hundred and twenty thousand men, after performing prodigies of valour, were almost entirely destroyed; three hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition waggons, trains, and equipages, fell into the power of the enemy, as well as a great number of prisoners; more than twenty thousand French corpses covered the field of battle, dreadfully mutilated by the grape shot.

The English also suffered a great loss, but far inferior to that of the French, because of the advantage of the position they occupied; nevertheless, we also reckon the number of killed in all the allied army at twenty thousand men. All accounts agree that at the outset of the action, the two armies were nearly of equal force; but, in fact, the English had much the advantage, because they waited for us steadily in their lines, and were also aided by the critical arrival of the Prussians, who came into action just as the affair was about to be decided.

It was easy to foresee the consequences of this battle, and that the Allies would soon be at the gates of Paris; in short, there was nothing to arrest the progress of their victorious march. The wrecks of the French army had rallied in the neighbourhood of Laon and Rheims, but were too feeble and too much disheartened to oppose them; they therefore advanced rapidly, and without loss of time, till they appeared under the walls of Paris.

The corps of Marshal Grouchy, instead of being lost, as was supposed, had retired with great good fortune upon Namur; and after having marched eight days in the midst of the Allies, and parallel to their line, they formed their junction with the rest of the army, without sustaining any great loss, contrary to general opinion and all probability.

Seventy thousand men, then, were found concentrated before Paris, and threatened to defend it; but what could such a force do against the combined armies of all Europe, which were marching with rapidity towards this central point? After some days of a resistance very alarming for the inhabitants, whose safety was indefinitely compromised by it, the obstinacy of the troops was at length conquered. This was an affair of great importance, as they were determined to hold out to the last extremity, and, in consequence, considered themselves at liberty to require the greatest sacrifices. By disposing

them gradually to accept a capitulation, and, as it were, tearing from them a consent to evacuate Paris, France truly gained a signal victory, which has probably saved the capital from total destruction, and the results of which are incalculable.

The battle of Mont St. Jean, by determining the occupation of Paris, and the restoration of the legitimate authority in France, has then put an end to the inhuman struggle into which Napoleon had engaged us. The sudden destruction of so many thousands of men, is without doubt a terrible catastrophe ; but if we consider it in another point of view, as the prompt and unexpected issue of a sanguinary war, to the ravages of which all France was about to be given up for an indeterminate time, we must be convinced that it is really an event the least fatal that could have happened under the unhappy circumstances in which we were placed.

Even supposing France unanimous in her efforts, it is evident she could not successfully resist all the forces of Europe arrayed against her ; she must have fallen after a contest more or less long, more or less murderous, but, in all cases, excessively disastrous for her. Hence the decisive results of the battle of Mont St. Jean have spared her, if not all the evils, at least, a great part of the calamities and horrors which awaited her, had the French territory

become the theatre of an active and bloody war.

France, a prey to the most dreadful devastations, would have been over-run by foreign armies, disputing among themselves for her spoils; the country, defended foot by foot, would not have been yielded till covered with carcasses and the ruins of burnt villages; the inhabitants, in despair, would have abandoned their homes, leaving them a prey to rapacious soldiers, thirsting for destruction as an indispensable want. Indeed, in this cruel supposition, there would be no distinction between friend and enemy, countryman and foreigner, defender and aggressor; all, animated with that spirit of Vandalism which has afflicted Europe for this five-and-twenty years, would have united their efforts to destroy, pillage, and ruin our unfortunate country to the utmost. Have not facts irresistibly proved that the sacred territory of a nation does not exist for men whom force has placed above all law?

If (as history affords us such frequent and terrible examples) the military of all times and all nations, on finding themselves sufficiently strong, have constantly been disposed to consider themselves a distinct corps, and to turn against their fellow-citizens those arms which had been confided to them for their defence; what protection could we expect from an army

exclusively attached to Napoleon, and who, by surrendering their country to him, declared themselves, in the face of all the world, the blind instruments of his arbitrary will?

If the French, during their incursions into the neighbouring states, have given examples of rapine and exactions, it must be confessed they have often been, if not surpassed, at least equalled by those of foreign armies formed upon their model; and each nation, by making more cruel reprisals, can, in their turn, give lessons of this sort.

As to the rest, this general demoralization is the inevitable fruits of the military code of Napoleon, which unhappily has extended itself over the whole of Europe, with such profound roots, that it is much to be feared his system will yet preponderate a long time.

This despotism is essentially subversive of all principles and all morality, the bold contemner of justice and the laws, and the insidious enemy of civilization; it is the greatest bane of empires and of society, or rather, there exists no empire, no society, where it is exclusively established. It gives rise to continual wars, because interest seeks dominion, and the wish to rule is natural to man. The military, when regarded as constituting a force for the defence of their fellow-citizens, are eminently worthy of their consideration; but in the case above cited, they soon forget

their profession is honourable and legitimate only when employed to maintain social order, and sacrificing their public duty to their own views of enriching themselves, and arriving at honour and great employ, they do not fail to abuse their power, by devoting it to their personal interests. They grasp at more and more, as fast as their wishes are easily accomplished; and war being to them the only means of succeeding, they consequently unceasingly provoke it.

An extensive military preponderance is, therefore, the greatest calamity that can befall a state, and inevitably leads to its ruin. All nations, conquerors, have in their turn been subjugated: overthrown by force, they are compelled to bow under the same iron yoke, which, as proud victors, they had placed on the necks of the vanquished. What nation more than France has acquired this fatal experience! can better appreciate the advantage of a military government, or the just value of brilliant conquests, and all the glory of arms! Each of these numerous triumphs, have they not caused her to lose a part of her intrinsic force? And all her superb armies, full of bravery, acknowledged as the best in the world, and almost always victorious;—have they not been conducted, one may almost say, from victory to victory—to death?

In short, this deplorable military despotism,

leads us back, with gigantic strides, to the ages of barbarism. Then, as in the days of anarchy of the Roman republic, when the factious legions, acknowledging no other law than their own arbitrary will, oppressed the people, and called the Generals of their choice to reign over them; or the same as in Asia, where the lawless Janissaries depose or elevate, according to their capricious will, the chiefs of the government. In fine, this state of things conducts us towards those disastrous epochs when feudal tyranny was established; yet, in these enlightened times, it would seem impossible to establish a feudal system, when all the world are so unanimous against it. Philanthropy is the offspring of civilization; man, when education has never corrected the ferocity of his character, is naturally cruel, and the enemy of his fellow-creature; he is, therefore, obliged, in self-defence, to resort to war from the first stage of his existence. It is only by degrees that mankind are united, and society cemented, as we witness it in the present day.

Let us conclude, then, from these observations, that a military government is the most oppressive, the least in unison with a state of civilization, and the most likely to throw us back to the barbarism of the first ages. It is urgent, then, to unite all our efforts in combatting a Vandalism which menaces us with such misfortunes. It is high time that order

should succeed to anarchy, and the protection of the laws to that of force.

As it cannot be doubted that Europe has taken this truly alarming military attitude, only because she has been constrained to it, to repel the unjust and unceasing aggressions of France, directed by the most ambitious of conquerors; the cause existing no more, the effects ought necessarily to cease also. Let us therefore hope that these events will at last give to the world that repose so fervently desired by all: and that Europe, instructed by so many calamities, will finally exert herself to cause all this apparatus of war to disappear, the permanence of which cannot fail to be the source of fresh revolutions.

France herself has not been vanquished in the struggle just terminated; on the contrary, she formed an integral part in the coalition against her oppressor: the nation then is not subjugated but delivered, and cannot, under any pretext, be treated as a conquered country. Rallied around her legitimate king, France finds herself at peace with all Europe. She has then a right, to put in her claim, to enjoy the advantages of a peace, towards the accomplishment of which she has contributed her part. Hence, she calls upon the allied Powers to fulfil the solemn promises made to her, which they cannot violate without forfeiting the noble title of liberators, and making them-

selves her implacable enemies. In this case, Europe would again be plunged into an abyss of woe: France, exasperated, would start forward to shake off the humiliating yoke they would impose upon her:—and seas of blood would recommence to flow.


But, we have too much faith in the moderation, the prudence and the justice, which preside in the councils of the confederated kings; and they have the peace and happiness of their own states too much at heart, to give us cause to dread a repetition of such evils.

On her side, France, by her actual position, can give the most satisfactory pledges for the stability of peace, the chief of which is doubtless the eminently mild, enlightened and humane character of her king, upon whom it will devolve, to dissipate entirely that spirit of levity and giddiness which has drawn the present generation into such disorder, and, we may add, immorality. It is reserved for our pacific, wise and virtuous king, to give a new impulse to the French character, or rather to lead it back to its true tone, and to re-establish, upon solid foundations, a liberal, just and energetic government, equally the protector of all its citizens, and the zealous preserver of the public morals and institutions, which secure the peace and prosperity of the nation: in a word, a government which contains within itself the principles of its duration.


Let us hope, then, that those of our warriors, who sincerely love their country, will persuade themselves that peace is the best blessing they can solicit, and, after the example of the great Regulus, whose virtuous conduct excites such just admiration, they will from this day, lay by their swords, as a glorious trophy of their former exploits, never to be unsheathed till called for in defence of their country; but giving themselves up to agriculture and the useful arts, which reflect true honour upon human nature, they will re-enter as peaceable citizens into the bosom of their families; they will then become respectable members of the state, which they will honour and enrich by their industry in promoting their private welfare; and in their turn, particularly interested in respecting the ties of society, they will be the first to repel the desolation and disasters of war, the evils of which they themselves best know.

Ostend, 8th December, 1815.

FINIS.



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Delbare, François-Thomas,

French Account of the last campaign of Buonaparte

London 1816

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